People And A Nation Brief Edition Meaning
Publication dateNovember 22, 1787Media typeNewspaperPreceded byFollowed byFederalist No. 10 is an essay written by as the tenth of, a series of essays initiated by arguing for the ratification of the. Published on November 22, 1787 under the name 'Publius', Federalist No. 10 is among the most highly regarded of all American political writings.No. 10 addresses the question of how to reconcile citizens with interests contrary to the rights of others or inimical to the interests of the community as a whole. Madison saw factions as inevitable due to the nature of man—that is, as long as men hold differing opinions, have differing amounts of wealth and own differing amount of property, they will continue to form alliances with people who are most similar to them and they will sometimes work against the public interest and infringe upon the rights of others.
He thus questions how to guard against those dangers. Federalist No. 10 continues a theme begun in and is titled ' The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection'. The whole series is cited by scholars and as an authoritative interpretation and explication of the meaning of the Constitution. Historians such as argue that No.
10 shows an explicit rejection by the of the principles of and factionalism, and argue that Madison suggests that a is more effective against and factionalism.Madison saw the Constitution as forming a 'happy combination' of a republic and a democracy, with 'the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures' resulting in a decentralized governmental structure. In his view, this would make it 'more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried.'
Preamble to thePrior to the Constitution, the thirteen states were bound together by the. These were, in essence, a military alliance between sovereign nations adopted to better fight the. Congress had no power to tax, and as a result, was not able to pay debts resulting from the Revolution. Madison, and others feared a break-up of the union and national bankruptcy. Like Washington, Madison felt the revolution had not resolved the social problems that had triggered it, and the excesses ascribed to the King were now being repeated by the state legislatures.
In this view, an armed uprising in Massachusetts in 1786, was simply one, albeit extreme, example of 'democratic excess' in the aftermath of the War.A was called for May 1787, to revise the Articles of Confederation. Madison believed that the problem was not with the Articles, but rather the state legislatures, and so the solution was not to fix the articles but to restrain the excesses of the states. The principal questions before the convention became whether the states should remain sovereign, whether sovereignty should be transferred to the national government, or whether a settlement should rest somewhere in between. By mid-June, it was clear that the convention was drafting a new plan of government around these issues—a constitution. Madison's nationalist position shifted the debate increasingly away from a position of pure state sovereignty, and toward the compromise. In a debate on June 26, he said that government ought to 'protect the minority of ' and that unchecked, democratic communities were subject to 'the turbulency and weakness of unruly passions'. Publication.
Paul Leicester Ford's summary preceding Federalist No. 10, from his 1898 edition of The FederalistSeptember 17, 1787 marked the signing of the final document. By its own, the constitution drafted by the convention needed ratification by at least nine of the thirteen states, through special conventions held in each state. Writers began to publish essays and letters arguing against ratification, and recruited and to write a series of pro-ratification letters in response.Like most of the Federalist essays and the vast majority of The Federalist Papers, No. 10 first appeared in popular newspapers. It was first printed in the Daily Advertiser under the name adopted by the Federalist writers, 'Publius'; in this it was remarkable among the essays of Publius, as almost all of them first appeared in one of two other papers: the Independent Journal and the New-York Packet., also by Madison, was the only other essay to appear first in the Advertiser.Considering the importance later ascribed to the essay, it was reprinted only on a limited scale. On November 23, it appeared in the Packet and the next day in the Independent Journal.
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Outside New York City, it made four appearances in early 1788: January 2 in the, January 10 in the Hudson Valley Weekly, January 15 in the Lansingburgh Northern Centinel, and January 17 in the Albany Gazette. Though this number of reprintings was typical for The Federalist essays, many other essays, both Federalist and Anti-Federalist, saw much wider distribution.On January 1, 1788, the publishing company J. McLean announced that they would publish the first 36 of the essays in a single volume. This volume, titled The Federalist, was released on March 2, 1788.
George Hopkins' 1802 edition revealed that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay were the authors of the series, with two later printings dividing the work by author. In 1818, James Gideon published a third edition containing corrections by Madison, who by that time had completed his two terms as President of the United States.Henry B. Dawson's edition of 1863 sought to collect the original newspaper articles, though he. It was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction. Paul Leicester Ford's 1898 edition included a table of contents which summarized the essays, with the summaries again used to preface their respective essays. The first date of publication and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. Of modern editions, Jacob E.
Cooke's 1961 edition is seen as authoritative, and is most used today. The question of faction Federalist No. 10 continues the discussion of the question broached in Hamilton's.
Hamilton there addressed the destructive role of a in breaking apart the republic. The question Madison answers, then, is how to eliminate the negative effects of faction. Madison defines a faction as 'a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community'.
He identifies the most serious source of faction to be the diversity of opinion in political life which leads to dispute over fundamental issues such as what regime or religion should be preferred.At the heart of Madison's fears about factions was the unequal distribution of property in society. Ultimately, 'the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property,' Madison argues (Dawson 1863, p. 58). Since some people owned property and others owned none, Madison felt that people would form different factions that pursued different interests. 'Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society,' he notes (Dawson 1863, p. 58). Providing some examples of the distinct interests, Madison identified a landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and 'many lesser interests' (Dawson 1863, p. 58). They all belonged to 'different classes' that were 'actuated by different sentiments and views,' Madison insists (Dawson 1863, p. 58).
In other words, Madison argued that the unequal distribution of property led to the creation of different classes that formed different factions and pursued different class interests.Moreover, Madison feared the formation of a certain kind of faction. Recognizing that the country's wealthiest property owners formed a minority and that the country's unpropertied classes formed a majority, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would come together to form a majority faction that gained control of the government. Against 'the minor party,' there could emerge 'an interested and overbearing majority,' Madison warns (Dawson 1863, pp. 55–56). Specifically, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would use their majority power to implement a variety of measures that redistributed wealth. There could be 'a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,' Madison warns (Dawson 1863, p. 64). In short, Madison feared that a majority faction of the unpropertied classes might emerge to redistribute wealth and property in a way that benefited the majority of the population at the expense of the country's richest and wealthiest people.Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay.
He also relied heavily on the philosophers of the, especially, whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types of faction and in his argument for an extended republic. Madison's arguments Madison first assessed that there are two ways to limit the damage caused by faction: either remove the causes of faction or control its effects. He then describes the two methods to removing the causes of faction: first, destroying liberty, which would work because 'liberty is to faction what air is to fire', but it is impossible to perform because liberty is essential to political life. After all, Americans fought for it during the. The second option, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests, is impracticable. The diversity of the people's ability is what makes them succeed more or less, and inequality of property is a right that the government should protect. Madison particularly emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the same opinion.
Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects.He then argues that the only problem comes from majority factions because the principle of popular sovereignty should prevent minority factions from gaining power. Madison offers two ways to check majority factions: prevent the 'existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time' or render a majority faction unable to act. Madison concludes that a small democracy cannot avoid the dangers of majority faction because small size means that undesirable passions can very easily spread to a majority of the people, which can then enact its will through the democratic government without difficulty.Madison states, 'The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man', so the cure is to control their effects. He makes an argument on how this is not possible in a pure democracy but possible in a republic. With pure democracy, he means a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws, and, with republic, he intends a society in which citizens elect a small body of representatives who then vote for laws. He indicates that the voice of the people pronounced by a body of representatives is more conformable to the interest of the community, since, again, common people's decisions are affected by their self-interest.He then makes an argument in favor of a large republic against a small republic for the choice of 'fit characters' to represent the public's voice.
In a large republic, where the number of voters and candidates is greater, the probability to elect competent representatives is broader. The voters have a wider option. In a small republic, it would also be easier for the candidates to fool the voters but more difficult in a large one.
The last argument Madison makes in favor of a large republic is that as, in a small republic, there will be a lower variety of interests and parties, a majority will more frequently be found. The number of participants of that majority will be lower, and, since they live in a more limited territory, it would be easier for them to agree and work together for the accomplishment of their ideas. While in a large republic the variety of interests will be greater so to make it harder to find a majority. Even if there is a majority, it would be harder for them to work together because of the large number of people and the fact they are spread out in a wider territory.A republic, Madison writes, is different from a democracy because its government is placed in the hands of delegates, and, as a result of this, it can be extended over a larger area. The idea is that, in a large republic, there will be more 'fit characters' to choose from for each delegate.
Also, the fact that each representative is chosen from a larger constituency should make the 'vicious arts' of electioneering (a reference to rhetoric) less effective. For instance, in a large republic, a corrupt delegate would need to bribe many more people in order to win an election than in a small republic. Also, in a republic, the delegates both filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims that impede purely democratic governments.Though Madison argued for a large and diverse republic, the writers of the Federalist Papers recognized the need for a balance. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with enough commonality to maintain cohesion among the states. In, counted as a blessing that America possessed 'one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, the same language, professing the same religion'. Madison himself addresses a limitation of his conclusion that large constituencies will provide better representatives.
He notes that if constituencies are too large, the representatives will be 'too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests'. He says that this problem is partly solved. No matter how large the constituencies of federal representatives, local matters will be looked after by state and local officials with naturally smaller constituencies.Contemporaneous counterarguments. George Clinton, believed to be the Anti-Federalist writer CatoThe vigorously contested the notion that a republic of diverse interests could survive. The author (another pseudonym, most likely that of ) summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no.
Epstein, p. 59. Bernstein, pp. 11–12, 81–109. Wood, Idea, p. 104. Wood, Idea, p. 103. Stewart, p. 182.
Yates. Ball, p. Xvii. For instance, the important Anti-Federalist authors 'Cato' and 'Brutus' debuted in New York papers on September 27 and October 18, 1787 respectively. See Furtwangler, pp. 48–49. Dates and publication information at, Constitution Society.
Accessed January 22, 2011. Kaminski and Saladino, Vol XIV, p. 175.
Adair, pp. 44–46. See also, SparkNotes. Accessed January 22, 2011. Ford, p. Xl.
Throughout Storing, for instance, and relied upon by De Pauw, pp. 202–204. Xlvii, it is the 'authoritative edition' and 'still stands as the most complete scholarly edition'. Federalist No. Of at Wikisource. Federalist No. Of at Wikisource. Federalist No.
Of at Wikisource. Cohler, pp. 148–161. Adair, pp. 93–106. Federalist No. Of at Wikisource.
Federalist No. Of at Wikisource.
Federalist No. Of at Wikisource. Federalist No. Of at Wikisource.
Federalist No. Of at Wikisource. Federalist No. – of the Dawson edition at Wikisource. Federalist No.
Of at Wikisource. See the accounts by, and conclusions of, Storing, Vol 1, pp. 102–104, Kaminski, p. 131, pp. 309–310, and Wood, Creation, p. 489.
De Pauw, pp. 290–292, prefers. The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 4, Document 16. University of Chicago Press.
Retrieved January 22, 2011. Ransom, Roger L. Economic History Association. August 24, 2001. Referenced November 20, 2005. Citing Beard; Hacker; Egnal; Ransom and Sutch; Bensel; and McPherson, Ransom notes that 'regional economic specialization. Generated very strong regional divisions on economic issues.
Economic changes in the Northern states were a major factor leading to the political collapse of the 1850s. The sectional splits on these economic issues. Led to a growing crisis in economic policy'.
Letter by Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787. The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 17, Document 22. University of Chicago Press.
Retrieved January 22, 2011. Cohler, p. 151. Yates is replete with examples.
Letter by to, October 27, 1786. The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 7, Document 7. University of Chicago Press. Retrieved January 22, 2011. Montesquieu, Spirit Of Laws, ch. I, book VIII, cited in.
The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 4, Document 14. University of Chicago Press. Retrieved January 22, 2011. The Founders' Constitution.
Volume 1, Chapter 4, Document 14. University of Chicago Press. Retrieved January 22, 2011.
'History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world'. Adair, p. 110., ourdocuments.gov, National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved January 22, 2011.
Epstein, p. 59. Adair, pp. 120–124. Quotation at p. 123. Adair, p. 131. Wills, p. 195., 530 U.S. 567, 592 (2000)., 415 U.S.
724, 736 (1974)., 528 U.S. 377, 424 (2000)References.
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Describe the differences in life expectancy around the world. List the potential problems associated with the growing proportion of older individuals in poor nations. Explain the evidence for inequality in U.S. Life expectancy.When we look historically and cross-culturally, we see that old age is a relative term, since few people in many of the societies we have discussed reach what most Americans would consider to be old, say 65 or older (or perhaps 50 or older, which entitles someone to membership in AARP, formerly called the American Association of Retired Persons). When we compare societies, we find that The average age to which people can be expected to live., or the average age to which people can be expected to live, varies dramatically across the world. As illustrates, life expectancy in North America, most of Europe, and Australia averages almost 75 years or more, while life expectancy in most of Africa, where the San live, averages less than 55 years. In some African nations, the average life expectancy is under 45 years (Population Reference Bureau, 2009).
Population Reference Bureau. 2009 world population data sheet. Washington, DC: Author.
Source: Adapted from Global Education Project. Human conditions: World life expectancy map. Retrieved fromWhat accounts for these large disparities? The major factor is the wealth or poverty of a nation, as the wealthiest nations have much longer life expectancies than the poorest ones. This is true because, as noted, the poorest or least developed nations by definition have little money and few other resources. They suffer from hunger, AIDS, and other diseases, and they lack indoor plumbing and other modern conveniences found in almost every home in the wealthiest nations. As a result, they have high rates of infant and childhood mortality, and many people who make it past childhood die prematurely from disease, starvation, and other problems.
We return to these problems in.These differences mean that few people in these societies reach the age of 65 that Western nations commonly mark as the beginning of old age. Depicts the percentage of each nation’s population that is 65 or older. Not surprisingly, the nations of Africa have very low numbers of people 65 or older. In Uganda, for example, only 3% of the population is at least 65, compared to 13% of Americans and 20% of Germans and Italians. Source: Adapted from Population Reference Bureau.
2007 world population data sheet. Retrieved fromDespite the international disparities we see in life expectancy, overall it has been increasing steadily around the world.
It was only 46 years worldwide in the early 1950s but was 69 in 2009 and is expected to reach about 75 by 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 2009; United Nations Population Division, 2009). Population Reference Bureau. 2009 world population data sheet. Washington, DC: Author; U.N.
Population Division. World population prospects: The 2008 revision. New York, NY: Author. This means that the number of people 65 or older is growing rapidly: they are expected to reach almost 1.5 billion worldwide by 2050, three times their number today and five times their number just 20 years ago (United Nations Population Division, 2009). Population Division. World population prospects: The 2008 revision.
New York, NY: Author. Despite international differences in life expectancy and the elderly percentage of the population, the world as a whole is decidedly “graying,” with important implications for the cost and quality of elder care and other issues (Hayutin, 2007). Graying of the global population. Public Policy & Aging Report, 17(4), 12–17.In wealthy nations, older people (65 or older) now constitute 15% of the population but will account for 26% by 2050. Because so many people die so young, poor nations historically have had very low percentages of older people, but this percentage is expected to increase from about 6% now to 15% in 2050. Two factors will account for this growth.
First, as in wealthy nations, life expectancy is increasing due to better health care and diets along with other factors, even if conditions in poor nations continue otherwise to be miserable overall. Second, poor nations are experiencing declining fertility; because fewer births means that a lower percentage of their populations will be young, a larger percentage of their populations will be older. © ThinkstockBy 2050, the percentage of older people in poor nations will equal the percentage of older people in rich nations today. The graying of their populations promises to pose special problems. Hautin (2007, p. 13) Hayutin, A. Graying of the global population.
Public Policy & Aging Report, 17(4), 12–17. Observes, “The rapid pace of aging in the less developed countries will require them to adjust much faster than has been necessary in more developed countries. Moreover, the sheer size of their populations will make their adjustments even more challenging.”A major problem will obviously involve paying for the increase in health care that the increase of older people in these nations will require. Because these nations are so poor, they will face even greater problems than the industrial world in paying for such care and for other programs and services their older citizens will need.
Another problem stems from the fact that many poor nations are beginning or continuing to industrialize and urbanize. As they do so, traditional family patterns, including respect for the elderly and the continuation of their roles and influence, may weaken. One reason for this is that urban families have smaller dwelling units in which to accommodate their elderly relatives and lack any land onto which to build new housing. As a result, families in poor nations will find it increasingly difficult to accommodate their elders.
Moreover, elders in poor nations have not had a chance to acquire the financial assets enjoyed by many of their counterparts in the industrial world, making them more dependent on their children and grandchildren than the industrial world’s elderly. Yet in sort of a Catch-22, their children and grandchildren typically have few assets of their own and thus have trouble affording to care for their elders. Sources: Data from Arias, E. United States life tables, 2006. National Vital Statistics Reports, 58(21), 1–40.Note that the average U.S.
People And A Nation Brief Edition Meaning List
Life expectancy in 1900 was similar to that seen today in many poor nations. A century ago, many Americans lacked proper sanitation and good nutrition and lived before the advent of modern medicine, when many deadly diseases were rampant. Many infants died before age 1 and many children died before age 10, lowering overall life expectancy. Improved public sanitation and the development of new drugs such as antibiotics helped greatly to reduce infant and childhood mortality in the first half of the 20th century and, in turn, to increase life expectancy (Haines, 2008). Fertility and mortality in the United States. Whaples (Ed.), Eh.Net encyclopedia.
Retrieved from Declining death rates among the elderly also help account for the increase in life expectancy shown in. In 1900, a 65-year-old person could expect to live another 11.9 years; the comparable figure for a 65-year-old now is almost 19 years, an increase of almost 7 years.During the next few decades, the numbers of the elderly will increase rapidly thanks to the large baby boom generation born after World War II (from 1946 to 1964) that is now entering its mid-60s. Shows the rapid rise of older Americans (65 or older) as a percentage of the population that is expected to occur.
Elders numbered about 3.1 million in 1900 (4.1% of the population), number about 40 million today, and are expected to reach 89 million by 2050 (20.2% of the population). The large increase in older Americans overall has been called the graying of America and will have important repercussions for elderly care and other aspects of old age in the United States, as we discuss later. Inequality in Life ExpectancyWe have seen that worldwide differences in life expectancy reflect global stratification. Inequality in life expectancy also exists within a given society along gender, race and ethnicity, and social class lines.For gender the inequality is in favor of women, who for both biological and social reasons (see ) outlive men across the globe. In the United States, for example, girls born in 2007 could expect to live 80.4 years on the average, but boys only 75.4 years.In most countries, race and ethnicity combine with social class to produce longer life expectancies for the (wealthier) dominant race, which in the Western world is almost always white. The United States again reflects this international phenomenon: whites born in 2007 could expect to live 78.4 years on the average, but African Americans only 73.6 years.
In fact, gender and race combine in the United States to put African American males at a particular disadvantage, as they can expect to live only 70.0 years (see ). The average African American male will die almost 11 years earlier than the average white woman.